Guest Editorial
New Directions in Criminal Behavior Studies: Revisiting the Unresolved Questions Bruce Arrigo During the past decade, investigators have begun to re-examine a number of taken-for-granted assumptions integral to scholarship in the cognate area of criminal behavior. Broadly defined, this subspecialty includes studies in legal psychology, clinical criminology, forensic mental health, and criminological psychiatry (Arrigo, in press-a) . Although mostly speculative and conceptual to date, this trend represents a radical departure from many mainstream liberal efforts at reform, as it challenges the ontological and epistemological commitments of the social and behavioral sciences, especially when applied to pressing and enduring problems at the law-psychology-crime divide. This editorial, then, briefly describes some of the key features informing this more heterodox agenda. Particular attention is given to the perspective's reassessment of established and unresolved issues in the study of criminal (and delinquent) behavior.
Positioned under the unifying banner of psychological jurisprudence (Arrigo, in press-b) , proponents of this radically inspired orientation argue that a significant body of technically relevant research has been published during the past 30 years (Arrigo, 2003b) . Examples include eyewitness testimony, jury selection, sex offender treatment, and risk assessment. However, what is deeply troubling about these investigations is that they are largely atheoretical (Ogloff, 2000) , mostly ignoring the philosophical context in which conclusions are reached and policy recommendations are proposed. In addition, although the scientific findings are useful in their own right, they often fail to contribute to or otherwise connect with the macrological debates concerning the administration of justice and prospects for structural change in society and in our lives (e.g., Arrigo, 2002a; Haney, 1993; Roesch, 1995) .
In response to these shortcomings, psychological jurisprudence is deliberately self-conscious about its theoretical standpoints and methodological predispositions. Moreover, the aim of this radical approach is to reclaim such values as humanism, fairness, citizenship, and equity in scholarly pursuits, acknowledging them as necessary and fundamental to any proper assessment of law-psychologycrime research and policy reform. Perhaps what is most interesting about psychological jurisprudence is its reliance on various strains of conceptual (and dissident) analysis, adapted from established and emerging lines of critical inquiry. Examples are found within such diverse intellectual realms as anarchism (Fox, 2001; Williams, in press ), Marxism (McCubbin & Weisstub, 1998) , deconstructionism (Arrigo, 2003a; Arrigo & Williams, 1999) , semiotics (Williams, 1998) , peacemaking criminology (Vitello, 2003) , chaos theory (Walters, 1999; Williams & Arrigo, 2002) , restorative justice (Noll, 2003) , constitutive theory (Arena & Arrigo, in press; Arrigo, 2001) , and postmodern psychoanalysis (Arrigo, 2002b) . Given its breadth, psychological jurisprudence, as a sophisticated challenge to orthodox reasoning in criminal behavior studies, endeavors to re-examine the taken-for-granted assumptions of much of what passes for law-psychology-crime research in the academy today.
However, more than signaling a return to philosophical exegeses in matters of criminal behavior studies, psychological jurisprudence reorients the scholarly community to the elementary and underlying questions the academy has yet to answer systematically. Consider the position of chaos theory: What is the nature of mental illness, predictions of dangerousness, and determinations of civil and criminal confinement, given the adaptive capacity of humans, as complex systems, to naturally self-organize in the face of extreme states of disorder? Consider the position of Marxism: In what way is the onset and maintenance of pedophilia and sexual misconduct-behaviors identified at the fringes of our culturelinked to the conditions of society at its center in which the proliferation of prepubescent sexuality is celebrated through corporate advertisements, media campaigns, and television network programming? Consider the position of postmodern psychoanalysis: If the words and expressions we use to describe the thoughts that we think convey hidden messages and implicit values that are convenient substitutes for our own sense of being and our unique way of knowing, whose voice is privileged in the discourse of legal psychology, clinical criminology, and forensic mental health, and to what extent is the subject's reality (e.g., the experiences of the offender, patient, prisoner) genuinely embodied (if at all) in the "system's" decision-making logic?
Central to these sorts of queries is a more subtle and reflective regard for such notions as agency, identity, personhood, community, autonomy, self-determination, responsibility, and freedom. Admittedly, these are intellectually challenging constructs to comprehend. Moreover, their meanings are not easily recognizable in a data set or a statistical equation, the preferred tools and techniques of the social and behavioral sciences. However, in its attempts to revisit the unresolved questions of the field, psychological jurisprudence forces us to acknowledge that much of the traditional research in criminal behavior studies neglects to consider these all too human dimensions of our existences. As such, these features of our being are assumed and relegated a peripheral status rather than critiqued and assigned a pivotal role in the scholarly investigations representative of the field.
Overall, then, I note that the questions asked, the methods endorsed, and the reasoning employed-unresolved, assumed, or unexamined by much of the conventional and progressive research in the sub-discipline-return us full throttle to the kinds of fundamental debates that criminal behavior studies regrettably has failed to address fully. To be sure, the answers remain elusive; however, they are not out of reach. The approach of psychological jurisprudence, as a radical departure theoretically and methodologically, reminds us that we can simultaneously make law-psychology-crime research relevant while promoting a set of core values whose effect advances prospects for structural and sustainable reform. From my perspective, this blueprint for change is itself a rallying cry for rethinking our approach to the human condition and to social relations. To this extent, then, the future of the discipline, and our ability to understand delinquency and crime for individuals, groups, and communities, will depend on how we champion the cause of reform and make real this call for justice in our lives and in the lives of others.
